The U.S. Supreme Court again upholds the constitution by refusing to allow the state of Georgia to re-try a Defendant on a charge in which he was acquitted, holding that it would violate the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution. When a jury appeared to have rendered inconsistent verdicts on various counts, finding Defendant McElrath not guilty by reason of insanity on one count but guilty but mentally ill on other counts, both of which could not be true for crimes that occurred at the same time, the Georgia Supreme Court remanded for retrial on all counts. The U.S. Supreme Court held that for double jeopardy purposes, the count in which McElrath was found not guilty by reason of insanity was an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, and he cannot be retried on that count. Retrial only could occur on the remaining counts (for which there had been a guilty verdict).
In reversing a conviction and remanding for dismissal, the Iowa Supreme Court discussed what does and does not constitute child endangerment. To violate the child endangerment statute, a parent must knowingly act in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a minor child’s physical, mental, or emotional health or safety. A substantial risk requires the very real possibility of danger. The court emphasized the word “create.” In this case, leaving six children, ages ranging from 5 to 12, home alone, did not create a substantial risk to their safety.
The court noted that life is inherently risky, and no parent can shield a child from all risks. Virtually any conduct has the possibility of endangering a child’s life, including playing on climbing equipment from which they could fall, playing football, driving a child to school vs. allowing them to walk. Courts “must exercise special caution when deciding whether a parent has created a particular risk and …be subject to criminal liability… . A parent does not create a risk if that risk is part of the background risk of ordinary life. Rather, a risk is created by a parent when the parent’s behavior produces an identifiable risk that falls outside the range of risks that accompany ordinary life. Ordinarily, this means that a parent creates a risk when that risk is the product of behavior that is (1) independently unlawful, that is unlawful under a statute other than section 726.6; or (2) overtly abusive.”
Such would include causing a fire in the home by smoking illegal drugs, causing severe bruises by hitting a child with a broomstick, leaving the child in the care of a known abuser, eluding the police at over 20 mph over the speed limit while children were in the car, hitting a child very hard or multiple times, causing injuries, shooting a gun near a child’s head, pointing a gun at the child’s mother in the child’s presence, brandishing a knife near a child’s face, using drugs in a child’s presence. Ordinarily, parent-created risks are those risks that arise from illegal or overtly abusive behavior.
There can be cases where neither apply, but the behavior still must create an identifiable risk which falls clearly outside the risks of ordinary life. For example, driving young children in the bed of a truck full of improperly loaded and tied down tree limbs and brush with little protection at the back of the truck to prevent items from falling or being blown out the back (only a wooden plank) – it was foreseeable that the branches might slide or be blown off, taking the children with them out of the truck and falling to their deaths. Although children have long ridden in the back of pickup trucks, this situation was more egregious than simply children riding in the back of a pickup. There is a difference between ordinarily risky situations and extraordinary risk. Leaving a severely intoxicated teen who had fallen and hit his head alone at home can be child endangerment. This includes willfully depriving a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care or supervision appropriate for the child’s age and which deprivation substantially harms the child – i.e. abandoning the child to fend for himself while knowing the child is unable to do so.
Here, no statute prohibited the defendant from leaving her children alone. No statute sets a minimum age at which children can be left home alone. The parent was not overtly abusive. No child was harmed. There was no identifiable risk that fell outside the range of risks that accompany ordinary life. There was no evidence that the mother’s actions created any extraordinary risk. There was no evidence showing that leaving the kids home was any riskier than driving with them to the store.
Ultimately, the child endangerment statute has both a subjective requirement, that is that the parent act knowingly, but it also has objective requirements, regardless of the parent’s subjective state of mind.
The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that the implied consent procedures contained within Iowa Code section 321J are not the exclusive means for an officer to investigate an OWI, and an officer may bypass the implied consent procedures and apply for a search warrant in lieu of utilizing implied consent.
Furthermore, in a similar case, the Court held that if the officer has applied for a search warrant for a body specimen, and subsequently violates Iowa Code section 804.20 by failing to allow a requested phone call to a lawyer or family member, the specimen obtained via the warrant is not necessarily suppressed and excluded, if the warrant was obtained via means independent of and not tainted by the subsequent rights violation.
The Iowa Supreme Court has found that a court cannot order restitution once it has issued an expungement order.
Iowa Court of Appeals holds that a defendant cannot be held responsible for the crime of introducing contraband or drugs into a correctional facility when the drugs were in a backpack which had been seized by the police, and it was the police who brought the backpack into the jail, not the defendant. Since the drugs were not on the defendant’s person, he could not be held responsible for the backpack which the police had seized and brought in with them.
Iowa Supreme Court rules that once a prison sentence has been imposed, on a motion for sentencing reconsideration, the Court can suspend the sentence, but it cannot grant a deferred judgment.
Iowa Supreme Court rules on personal jurisdiction in a civil case, but which potentially could have implications in criminal or civil no contact case proceedings.
The Iowa Supreme Court holds that detaining a truck driver for any time beyond that which is reasonably necessary to conclude the purposes of the initial stop/seizure is unconstitutional.
Iowa Court of Appeals reverses theft conviction, holding that the State failed to prove intent to permanently deprive.
Any Reference to the PBT can be Prejudicial
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that even if the preliminary breath test numerical results (PBT) are not provided to the jury, merely showing the jury that the Defendant took the PBT, even without providing a numerical result, juxtaposed with the arrest, is an impermissible suggestion of a result over .08, and furthermore, the mere fact that the Defendant took the PBT is irrelevant, or has minimal relevance if any, and any such minimal relevance is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and therefore, admitting into evidence the mere fact that the Defendant took a PBT, in an OWI prosecution, is a violation of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403 and should not be admitted into Operating While Intoxicated trials.
After a successful ruling by the Court granting the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence based on an unconstitutional seizure, and the State’s Motion to Dismiss based on that ruling, my client’s charges of possession of drugs, public intoxication, and interference with official acts have all been dismissed.
After a trial to the judge, based on stipulated evidence, my client was found not guilty by reason of insanity of the charges of assault with a dangerous weapon on a peace officer and criminal mischief.