The Iowa Supreme Court has held that fourth-degree theft and unauthorized use of a credit card are different crimes for purposes of the 45 day speedy indictment rule.
The Iowa Supreme Court has clarified that under the old rules of Criminal Procedure, the 45-day speedy indictment does not apply unless there is an appearance before a magistrate or a waiver of such is filed, but the time to start the running of the deadline begins with the date of arrest. However, under the newly amended rules of Criminal procedure, the time to start the running of the clock for a speedy indictment does not begin unless and until either the Defendant appears before a magistrate or a waiver of such is filed. The date of arrest no longer is the applicable starting point for the running of the speedy trial deadline to file a trial information.
The Iowa Court of Appeals has reversed and remanded the suppression ruling in my client’s case. “Richard Eugene Noll appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. OPINION HOLDS: We affirm the district court’s ruling on the validity of the traffic stop but reverse and remand with directions to decide the lawfulness of the search of Noll’s person leading to the discovery of methamphetamine as outlined in this opinion.”
Iowa Court of Appeals rules that because a defendant, who was arrested on an assault charge, had no realistic ability to access a fanny pack after he handed it to a friend before he was handcuffed and then escorted to the police patrol car, the search of the fanny pack did not meet the search incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Hence, the drugs were found unconstitutionally, without a valid warrant exception.
The Iowa Supreme Court confirms that drug dog sniffs are valid even if the dog briefly touches the exterior of the vehicle, as long as the dog is in a place where it and the police are lawfully allowed to be and does not enter the interior of the vehicle.
The Iowa Supreme Court has issued an interesting and informative opinion regarding the privileges and immunities clause, which involves potentially improper discrimination against those who live out of state.
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that while there are certain limited circumstances in which a witness can be allowed to testify live via closed circuit television, the confrontation clause requires both the defendant and the witness to be able to see one another via that process. Failure to allow such requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal law prohibits officials from accepting bribes before the official takes an act, but does not prohibit accepting gratuities after an act is taken, as long as there was no agreed-upon quid pro quo prior to the act. It is up to the states and local governments to pass and enforce laws regarding gratuities.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote:
Section 666 of Title 18 makes it a crime for state and local officials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. §666(a)(1)(B). That law prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes that are promised or given before the official act. Those bribes are punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
The question in this case is whether §666 also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos, or the like—that may be given as a token of appreciation after the official act. The answer is no. State and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept. Section 666 does not supplement those state and local rules by subjecting 19 million state and local officials to up to 10 years in federal prison for accepting even commonplace gratuities. Rather, §666 leaves it to state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials.”
In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch wrote:
Call it what you will. The Court today speaks of inferences from the word “corruptly,” the statute’s history and structure, and associated punishments. See ante, at 7. It discusses concerns of fair notice and federalism. Ibid. But the bottom line is that, for all those reasons, any fair readerof this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt about whether it covers the defendant’s charged conduct. And when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for theprosecutor but for the presumptively free individual. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 464–465 (2019).
Lenity may sometimes, as it does today, go unnamed. It may be deployed under other guises, too. “Fair notice” or “fair warning” are especially familiar masks. See, e.g., ante, at 7, 11, 13; Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–7, 9– 10 (2018); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576 (2016). Cf. Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, 389 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (“Lenityworks to enforce the fair notice requirement”); Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 548 (2015) (plurality opinion) (same). Other times, we clothe lenity in its corollary—thatcourts cannot “rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the” scope of an “otherwise wide-ranging” criminal law. Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11; see, e.g., ante, at 13; Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110, 131 (2023). And in still other instances, we do much the same when we speak of the “restraint” necessary “in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” Id., at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Marinello, 584 U. S., at 6–7, 11; Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703 (2005).
But make no mistake: Whatever the label, lenity is what’s at work behind today’s decision, just as it is in so many others. Rightly so. I am pleased to join.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that those who pose a credible threat of physical violence and harm to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the 2nd amendment. Hence, a person who has had due process and a hearing, and found to pose a credible threat to the safety of another, and therefore subject to a protective restraining order, may be subject to statutory firearms restrictions for the duration of the restraining order.
At issue was Section 922(g)(8) prohibits an individual subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm, so long as certain criteria are met. Such a restriction does not violate the 2nd amendment.
The Iowa Supreme Court has reversed a sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge. The Court held that a sentencing judge cannot consider the fact that the Defendant had not paid any restitution prior to a restitution order being entered. Also, the Supreme Court held that it is improper for a judge to order portions of an appeal bond to be forfeited towards the payment of restitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a bump stock is not a machine gun.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/22-976#writing-22-976_OPINION_4
Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that sexual conduct by a school employee can include hugging when viewed in context of other activities.