The Iowa Supreme Court has held that while there are certain limited circumstances in which a witness can be allowed to testify live via closed circuit television, the confrontation clause requires both the defendant and the witness to be able to see one another via that process. Failure to allow such requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal law prohibits officials from accepting bribes before the official takes an act, but does not prohibit accepting gratuities after an act is taken, as long as there was no agreed-upon quid pro quo prior to the act. It is up to the states and local governments to pass and enforce laws regarding gratuities.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote:
Section 666 of Title 18 makes it a crime for state and local officials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. §666(a)(1)(B). That law prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes that are promised or given before the official act. Those bribes are punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
The question in this case is whether §666 also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos, or the like—that may be given as a token of appreciation after the official act. The answer is no. State and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept. Section 666 does not supplement those state and local rules by subjecting 19 million state and local officials to up to 10 years in federal prison for accepting even commonplace gratuities. Rather, §666 leaves it to state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials.”
In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch wrote:
Call it what you will. The Court today speaks of inferences from the word “corruptly,” the statute’s history and structure, and associated punishments. See ante, at 7. It discusses concerns of fair notice and federalism. Ibid. But the bottom line is that, for all those reasons, any fair readerof this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt about whether it covers the defendant’s charged conduct. And when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for theprosecutor but for the presumptively free individual. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 464–465 (2019).
Lenity may sometimes, as it does today, go unnamed. It may be deployed under other guises, too. “Fair notice” or “fair warning” are especially familiar masks. See, e.g., ante, at 7, 11, 13; Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–7, 9– 10 (2018); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576 (2016). Cf. Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, 389 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (“Lenityworks to enforce the fair notice requirement”); Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 548 (2015) (plurality opinion) (same). Other times, we clothe lenity in its corollary—thatcourts cannot “rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the” scope of an “otherwise wide-ranging” criminal law. Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11; see, e.g., ante, at 13; Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110, 131 (2023). And in still other instances, we do much the same when we speak of the “restraint” necessary “in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” Id., at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Marinello, 584 U. S., at 6–7, 11; Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703 (2005).
But make no mistake: Whatever the label, lenity is what’s at work behind today’s decision, just as it is in so many others. Rightly so. I am pleased to join.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that those who pose a credible threat of physical violence and harm to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the 2nd amendment. Hence, a person who has had due process and a hearing, and found to pose a credible threat to the safety of another, and therefore subject to a protective restraining order, may be subject to statutory firearms restrictions for the duration of the restraining order.
At issue was Section 922(g)(8) prohibits an individual subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm, so long as certain criteria are met. Such a restriction does not violate the 2nd amendment.
The Iowa Supreme Court has reversed a sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge. The Court held that a sentencing judge cannot consider the fact that the Defendant had not paid any restitution prior to a restitution order being entered. Also, the Supreme Court held that it is improper for a judge to order portions of an appeal bond to be forfeited towards the payment of restitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a bump stock is not a machine gun.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/22-976#writing-22-976_OPINION_4
Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that sexual conduct by a school employee can include hugging when viewed in context of other activities.
Iowa Supreme Court holds that a term of probation requires a set fixed term of years, and cannot be for a range of time.
Iowa Supreme Court reverses conviction for assault causing injury, holding that the jury instructions on the self-defense justification claim, asserting the new stand your ground law, were erroneous. Case has been remanded for a new trial.
Iowa Supreme Court holds that a court cannot enter a no contact order for a dismissed charge. NCOs only can be entered to counts involving victims in which the defendant pled or was found guilty.
Iowa Court of Appeals holds that it is impermissible for a sentencing judge to take into consideration the Defendant’s insistence on taking the case to trial, maintaining his innocence, and refusing to admit guilt.
The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that an antique muzzleloader rifle qualifies as a firearm within the meaning of Iowa Code section 724.26(1), which prohibits felons from possessing a firearm or offensive weapon.
Iowa Supreme Court holds that the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure is per person, not per exposure. Meaning, the Defendant was properly convicted of two counts for one exposure, because two persons observed the exposure; hence two counts.
