The Iowa Supreme Court has held that convictions for attempt to commit murder and assault on persons in certain occupations do not merge. Under the controlling statute, merger is not required unless there are “verdict[s] of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict[s]” establish that one offense is “necessarily included in another public offense.” Iowa Code § 701.9 (2019).
The Iowa Supreme Court discusses the law’s timeline requirements and potential independent evaluations when it comes to establishing mental/psychological competency to stand trial.
Iowa Supreme Court confirms that a sentencing judge’s failure to articulate why a consecutive sentence is being issued requires a remand and resentencing.
The Iowa Court of Appeals discusses the limitations of an intoxication defense, which negates specific intent, but is not a defense to general intent crimes. The fighting issue, then, is whether certain crimes are general intent or specific intent crimes.
An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and sentenced her to death. The State spent significant time at trial introducing evidence about Andrew’s sex life and about her failings as a mother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant. In a federal habeas petition, Andrew argued that this evidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals rejected that claim because, it thought, no holding of the U.S. Supreme Court established a general rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. That was wrong. By the time of Andrew’s trial, the U.S. Supreme Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 825 (1991).
Proof of movement is required for a conviction for going armed with intent.
The Iowa Court of Appeals notes that when a plea agreement is struck, a prosecuting attorney most not only inform the sentencing court of the agreement, but is duty-bound to affirmatively recommend that said plea agreement be honored. Failure to do so is a breach of the agreement requiring re-sentencing before a different judge.
The Iowa Supreme Court rules that the standard for change of venue is a stringent one, and the State must be held to the same standard as the Defendant. A case generally must be tried in the county of the alleged incident. When there are insufficient grounds for change of venue, the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial in the proper venue.
The Iowa Supreme Court confirms that an obscured license plate that affects an officer’s ability to read the plate is grounds for a seizure. Even if the officer can read the plate as he approaches the vehicle once outside, he is not obligated to turn around and leave.
Furthermore, it is not unconstitutional for a drug dog to touch the outside of the vehicle and stick its nose inside an open window.
Iowa Supreme Court holds that the constitutionality of a search should be evaluated by the law of the sovereign that initiated and conducted the search—not by the law of the sovereign that had nothing to do with the search. Hence, if an individual is on federal probation, and federal officers conduct a search, then the interpretation of the federal constitution determines whether the search is legal, not the interpretation of the Iowa constitution, even if the State of Iowa ultimately is the entity that prosecutes the individual under state law and the search may not have been constitutional under the State of Iowa’s constitution.
A sentencing court’s failure to explain why consecutive sentences were being imposed (as opposed to concurrent) is reversible error requiring a resentencing.
Prosecutor breach of plea agreement by failing to advocate for an agreed-upon term leads to a re-sentencing in front of a different judge.