An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and sentenced her to death. The State spent significant time at trial introducing evidence about Andrew’s sex life and about her failings as a mother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant. In a federal habeas petition, Andrew argued that this evidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals rejected that claim because, it thought, no holding of the U.S. Supreme Court established a general rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. That was wrong. By the time of Andrew’s trial, the U.S. Supreme Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 825 (1991).
Proof of movement is required for a conviction for going armed with intent.
The Iowa Court of Appeals notes that when a plea agreement is struck, a prosecuting attorney most not only inform the sentencing court of the agreement, but is duty-bound to affirmatively recommend that said plea agreement be honored. Failure to do so is a breach of the agreement requiring re-sentencing before a different judge.
The Iowa Supreme Court rules that the standard for change of venue is a stringent one, and the State must be held to the same standard as the Defendant. A case generally must be tried in the county of the alleged incident. When there are insufficient grounds for change of venue, the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial in the proper venue.
The Iowa Supreme Court confirms that an obscured license plate that affects an officer’s ability to read the plate is grounds for a seizure. Even if the officer can read the plate as he approaches the vehicle once outside, he is not obligated to turn around and leave.
Furthermore, it is not unconstitutional for a drug dog to touch the outside of the vehicle and stick its nose inside an open window.
Iowa Supreme Court holds that the constitutionality of a search should be evaluated by the law of the sovereign that initiated and conducted the search—not by the law of the sovereign that had nothing to do with the search. Hence, if an individual is on federal probation, and federal officers conduct a search, then the interpretation of the federal constitution determines whether the search is legal, not the interpretation of the Iowa constitution, even if the State of Iowa ultimately is the entity that prosecutes the individual under state law and the search may not have been constitutional under the State of Iowa’s constitution.
A sentencing court’s failure to explain why consecutive sentences were being imposed (as opposed to concurrent) is reversible error requiring a resentencing.
Prosecutor breach of plea agreement by failing to advocate for an agreed-upon term leads to a re-sentencing in front of a different judge.
The Iowa Supreme Court holds that the implied consent statute requires officer compliance with the statutory requirements of a written request for a chemical test specimen, and that test consent without use of such mandatory procedures is invalid and inadmissible.
The question presented in the OWI case was whether a peace officer can bypass the statutory implied consent provisions and request a motorist provide a bodily specimen for a chemical breath test without a written request and without advising the motorist of the consequences associated with refusing or submitting to the request for a chemical breath test. The Court answered in the negative, absent a warrant or other statutory exceptions. “We conclude the statute is unambiguous and requires a peace officer who requests a motorist to provide a bodily specimen for chemical testing to do so in accord with the statutory procedures when certain conditions exist.”
The Iowa Supreme Court discusses what is required of a Defendant to satisfy his burden of proof in order to obtain a restoration of his firearms rights under Iowa Code section 724.31, in the context of one who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution, upholding the statute’s constitutionality under the newly amended Iowa Constitution.
The Iowa Supreme Court discusses corporal punishment and its limits in the context of a child endangerment case, as well as the imitations on a guardian ad litem’s ability to make sentencing recommendations.
Iowa Supreme Court holds that the evidence was insufficient to show that the Defendant was attempting to engage in commercial sexual activity under Iowa Code section 710A.1(1). The defendant’s did not give or promise any item of value in exchange for a sex act or sexually explicit performance. Any offers that the defendant made were to facilitate a sexual relationship but were not in exchange for sex—or were vague and did not rise to the necessary level to constitute a promise.
The Defendant did not promise, give, or receive items of value in exchange for sex. There must be a quid pro quo offer in exchange sex. Merely arranging a ride or location, things to facilitate the sex, but not in exchange for the sex, do not violate the statute. Although the defendant told the girl he had no problem spoiling her or giving her certain items when they were together, there never was a direct acknowledgment that he would provide anything of value in exchange for sexual activity. In summary, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed that Iowa Code section 710A.1(1) requires an express or implied quid pro quo.