The Iowa Supreme Court holds that the implied consent statute requires officer compliance with the statutory requirements of a written request for a chemical test specimen, and that test consent without use of such mandatory procedures is invalid and inadmissible.

The question presented in the OWI case was whether a peace officer can bypass the statutory implied consent provisions and request a motorist provide a bodily specimen for a chemical breath test without a written request and without advising the motorist of the consequences associated with refusing or submitting to the request for a chemical breath test. The Court answered in the negative, absent a warrant or other statutory exceptions. “We conclude the statute is unambiguous and requires a peace officer who requests a motorist to provide a bodily specimen for chemical testing to do so in accord with the statutory procedures when certain conditions exist.”

 

Read the case

The Iowa Supreme Court discusses what is required of a Defendant to satisfy his burden of proof in order to obtain a restoration of his firearms rights under Iowa Code section 724.31, in the context of one who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution, upholding the statute’s constitutionality under the newly amended Iowa Constitution.

Read the case

The Iowa Supreme Court discusses corporal punishment and its limits in the context of a child endangerment case, as well as the imitations on a guardian ad litem’s ability to make sentencing recommendations.

Read the case 

Iowa Supreme Court holds that the evidence was insufficient to show that the Defendant was attempting to engage in commercial sexual activity under Iowa Code section 710A.1(1). The defendant’s did not give or promise any item of value in exchange for a sex act or sexually explicit performance. Any offers that the defendant made were to facilitate a sexual relationship but were not in exchange for sex—or were vague and did not rise to the necessary level to constitute a promise.

The Defendant did not promise, give, or receive items of value in exchange for sex. There must be a quid pro quo offer in exchange sex. Merely arranging a ride or location, things to facilitate the sex, but not in exchange for the sex, do not violate the statute. Although the defendant told the girl he had no problem spoiling her or giving her certain items when they were together, there never was a direct acknowledgment that he would provide anything of value in exchange for sexual activity. In summary, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed that Iowa Code section 710A.1(1) requires an express or implied quid pro quo.

Read the case

The Iowa Supreme Court has held that fourth-degree theft and unauthorized use of a credit card are different crimes for purposes of the 45 day speedy indictment rule.

Read the case

The Iowa Supreme Court has clarified that under the old rules of Criminal Procedure, the 45-day speedy indictment does not apply unless there is an appearance before a magistrate or a waiver of such is filed, but the time to start the running of the deadline begins with the date of arrest. However, under the newly amended rules of Criminal procedure, the time to start the running of the clock for a speedy indictment does not begin unless and until either the Defendant appears before a magistrate or a waiver of such is filed. The date of arrest no longer is the applicable starting point for the running of the speedy trial deadline to file a trial information.

Read the case

The Iowa Court of Appeals has reversed and remanded the suppression ruling in my client’s case. “Richard Eugene Noll appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.  OPINION HOLDS: We affirm the district court’s ruling on the validity of the traffic stop but reverse and remand with directions to decide the lawfulness of the search of Noll’s person leading to the discovery of methamphetamine as outlined in this opinion.”

Iowa Court of Appeals rules that because a defendant, who was arrested on an assault charge, had no realistic ability to access a fanny pack after he handed it to a friend before he was handcuffed and then escorted to the police patrol car, the search of the fanny pack did not meet the search incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Hence, the drugs were found unconstitutionally, without a valid warrant exception.

Read the case

The Iowa Supreme Court confirms that drug dog sniffs are valid even if the dog briefly touches the exterior of the vehicle, as long as the dog is in a place where it and the police are lawfully allowed to be and does not enter the interior of the vehicle.

Read the case

The Iowa Supreme Court has issued an interesting and informative opinion regarding the privileges and immunities clause, which involves potentially improper discrimination against those who live out of state.

Read the case

The Iowa Supreme Court has held that while there are certain limited circumstances in which a witness can be allowed to testify live via closed circuit television, the confrontation clause requires both the defendant and the witness to be able to see one another via that process. Failure to allow such requires reversal and remand for a new trial.

Read the case

 

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal law prohibits officials from accepting bribes before the official takes an act, but does not prohibit accepting gratuities after an act is taken, as long as there was no agreed-upon quid pro quo prior to the act. It is up to the states and local governments to pass and enforce laws regarding gratuities.

Justice Kavanaugh wrote:

Section 666 of Title 18 makes it a crime for state and local officials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. §666(a)(1)(B). That law prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes that are promised or given before the official act. Those bribes are punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

The question in this case is whether §666 also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos, or the like—that may be given as a token of appreciation after the official act. The answer is no. State and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept. Section 666 does not supplement those state and local rules by subjecting 19 million state and local officials to up to 10 years in federal prison for accepting even commonplace gratuities. Rather, §666 leaves it to state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials.”

In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch wrote:

Call it what you will. The Court today speaks of inferences from the word “corruptly,” the statute’s history and structure, and associated punishments. See ante, at 7. It discusses concerns of fair notice and federalism. Ibid. But the bottom line is that, for all those reasons, any fair readerof this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt about whether it covers the defendant’s charged conduct. And when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for theprosecutor but for the presumptively free individual. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 464–465 (2019).

Lenity may sometimes, as it does today, go unnamed. It may be deployed under other guises, too. “Fair notice” or “fair warning” are especially familiar masks. See, e.g., ante, at 7, 11, 13; Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–7, 9– 10 (2018); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576 (2016). Cf. Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, 389 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (“Lenityworks to enforce the fair notice requirement”); Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 548 (2015) (plurality opinion) (same). Other times, we clothe lenity in its corollary—thatcourts cannot “rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the” scope of an “otherwise wide-ranging” criminal law. Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11; see, e.g., ante, at 13; Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110, 131 (2023). And in still other instances, we do much the same when we speak of the “restraint” necessary “in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” Id., at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Marinello, 584 U. S., at 6–7, 11; Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703 (2005).

But make no mistake: Whatever the label, lenity is what’s at work behind today’s decision, just as it is in so many others. Rightly so. I am pleased to join.

Read the case